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I. THE RIGHT TO CREATIVE ILLEGITIMACY: ART AND THE FALLACY OF 
PROPRIETARY LEGITIMATION 
“[T]he values and norms in accordance with which motives are formed 
have an immanent relation with truth.”1
— Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis 
“As ‘truth’ is not a name for a characteristic of assertions, so ‘freedom’ 
is not a name for a characteristic of actions, but the name of a 
dimension in which actions are assessed.”2
— John Langshaw Austin, “A Plea for Excuses” 
When we speak of the arts, and more so when one engages with the arts 
as a practitioner in their various contexts, the questions of legitimacy and 
legitimation take a very different turn. This spans across a wide horizon, 
whether it is that of art-making in the studio; of showing in the gallery; of 
performing in the hall; or of teaching, learning and unlearning in schools, 
colleges or universities. 
To start with, one needs to understand and find a way of differentiating 
between legitimacy and legitimation. Legitimacy implies a degree of 
conformity, whether it is with the law, agreed rules, or a grammar of speech, 
practice, and procedure.3 Legitimation is the action by which legitimacy is or 
could be claimed.4 In terms of images, by which we mostly make art, the 
process of being justified and verified, and more so, in terms of a manner by 
which a process of legitimation comes forth, emerges from that which is shown
in terms of what it represents to groups and individuals who, in being 
recognized as sources of legitimacy, are then ready to give it.5
This raises an immediate question: is legitimacy a gift that is expected from 
others? In turn, this could imply that as recipients of this gift, human actions 
only gain the validity of what they represent so as to have a value that is 
identifiable with forms of legitimation established outside them. Values that 
immediately come to mind, when the arts are presented within this realm of 
legitimacy, would include those aesthetic, pedagogical, social, and moral 
1. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 95 (T. McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1975) 
(1973).
2. JOHN L. AUSTIN, A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address, 57 PROC. OF THE 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, NEW SERIES 1, 6 (1956). 
3. See, e.g., JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 12
(1970).
4. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 95–96. 
5. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO PHILOSOPHICUS § 2.17–2.174 (C.K. 
Ogden trans., Routledge 1981) (1981). 
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categories from which one could always glean a political set of assumptions. 
These are often sustained and justified by socio-economic metrics that are now 
linked to the so-called culture and creative industries.6 The latter seems to have 
completed the circle of legitimacy, where the arts are not simply seen, but 
expected to justify their existence from perspectives that are tangible, and to 
which the institutional voice of the arts is increasingly and often actively, giving 
assent.7
II. LEGITIMIZING CONFLICTS
This state of affairs has had a strong impact on the language of artistic 
legitimation, especially where there has been a significant turn on norms and 
categories that many accept as being helpful and therefore benign in making a 
case for the arts.8 Making such a case implies a variety of contexts. They span 
from the case for the arts in education, from primary to tertiary education,9 to
that of funding the arts in the community, from sources that range between the 
state and the private sectors.10
In her inaugural blog of August this year, aptly titled Advocacy,
Community, and Arts Wisconsin, the Board President of Arts Wisconsin, Ann 
Huntoon, states that “we can all agree on one thing—the arts are indispensable. 
There’s no doubt that music heals, that making art is a panacea, that 
experiencing art with others brings us together.”11
This falls in line with a national and more widespread international 
6. John Baldacchino, What Creative Industries? Instrumentalism, Autonomy and the Education 
of Artists, 9 INT’L J. OF EDUC. THROUGH ART, 343–56 (2013). 
7. See GEORGE DICKIE, ART AND VALUE 77–81, 92–95 (2001). 
8. See CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRIES, First steps: A new approach for our schools.
(last visited 27 April 2018) 
http://www.cbi.org.uk/index.cfm/_api/render/file/?method=inline&fileID=2138B72B-84FF-4FD7-
9AFFC01BED033137 [https://perma.cc/W72Y-UQWU]. 
9. See KEN ROBINSON, THE ARTS IN SCHOOLS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND PROVISION 4–5
(1982); KEN ROBINSON, OUT OF OUR MINDS: THE POWER OF BEING CREATIVE 49–79 (2017). 
10. A few examples in Wisconsin include Arts Wisconsin’s portal, ARTS WISCONSIN,
http://www.artswisconsin.org [https://perma.cc/9EPF-K55V] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017), and indeed 
my own institution, The Arts Institute, which is the division of the arts at the University of Wisconsin- 
Madison, ARTS INSTITUTE, https://artsinstitute.wisc.edu [https://perma.cc/R859-5RNM] (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2017), whose arts portal, Arts on Campus, UNIV. OF WISCONSIN-MADISON,
https://arts.wisc.edu [https://perma.cc/9W4W-69BZ] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017), serves as the unified 
gateway to the arts in our university and the community. This is just a drop in the ocean, but as 
institutions that both share the same terrain of interest and to an extent have common interests, they 
provide a quick illustration of a narrative has become very clearly articulated on specific categories of 
legitimacy. 
11. Ann Huntoon, Advocacy, Community, and Arts Wisconsin, ARTS WISCONSIN (Aug. 17, 
2017), http://www.artswisconsin.org/advocacy-community-and-arts-wisconsin/ [https://perma.cc/M4 
AQ-VDPP] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
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approach to the arts, and I would own up to partaking in the same debate.12
More so, I have to accept that whether I would agree or not, I find myself using 
the same narratives to put my foot in the door of a wider set of constituencies 
that often need help to understand why the arts matter. Yet I should add, that 
this is also a source of discomfort, which often leaves me highly critical as well 
as skeptical over whether we can afford to risk falling foul of the law of 
unintended consequences, not knowing exactly whether Adam Smith’s 
infamous “invisible hand”13 has anything to do with art’s polity, not to mention 
its inherent economy. 
Yet one must hastily add that while actors in this scenario tend to engage 
and use this language, not everyone keeps on the same legitimizing hat 
throughout one’s engagement with the arts. There is a caveat to this narrative, 
and it is made with some force. This has to do with the apparent contradiction 
between the arts’ intrinsic value and their use, which immediately brings to play 
one’s own existential experience of the arts, what John Dewey calls the “quality 
of being a whole and of belonging to the larger, all-inclusive whole, which is 
the universe in which we live.”14
Additionally, this implies a personal sphere, where the arts administrator 
recalls her own intrinsic relationship with art-making, as Huntoon does when 
she speaks of her comfort zone, which she felt that she had to exit once she 
became an arts advocate.15 “My mother’s father was a cattle rancher in Illinois, 
but spent the winter months in a room in the farmhouse, painting landscapes in 
oil.”16 Being introduced to the work of Ruth Stolle, an artist from Tripoli, 
Wisconsin, by her father, Huntoon describes how her family “spent afternoons 
at [Stolle’s] home, amidst her hundreds of sketches, paintings, and stacks of 
books. We had several of her paintings hanging in our home. The ideals of 
these experiences are my comfort zone, and never imagined that these things 
weren’t a part of everyone’s lives.”17
Before adding this personal note, Huntoon states how she “began to 
understand that the role of being an arts advocate meant that the first 
requirement was the ability to step way outside of my comfort zone.”18 Here 
12. See generally Baldacchino, supra note 6; John Baldacchino, Art’s Asymptotic Leadership: 
Arts leadership, Education and the Loss of Autonomy, 3 VISUAL INQUIRY 291 (2014). 
13. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
BOOK IV, CHAPTER 2, at 30 (New Rochelle NY, Arlington House 1966), available online at 2 LIB. OF
ECON. & LIBERTY 30, http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN13.html [https://perma.cc/5UE6- 
RBNZ].
14. JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 202 (1958).
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she highlights a play between two forms of legitimation: an intrinsic, personal 
if not existential, engagement with art-making, and an extrinsic, verging on the 
instrumental, sphere of activity by which one becomes an advocate for the 
arts.19
Huntoon’s words capture these conflicting forms of legitimation, which 
some may well not regard as such, but which here I want to dwell upon, if only 
to argue that unless we remain aware of such a conflict, the case for the arts 
may well be impaired by a degree of confusion that risks slotting the arts into 
static categories of legitimation. I would add that the detrimental effect of such 
a rigid categorization would mean two things: (a) the increasing 
instrumentalization of the arts which results in a detachment between art- 
making and arts institutions, and (b) paraphrasing Max Horkheimer ,20 the total 
eclipse of the arts’ unique forms of action and reasoning, by which in their 
complex histories, human beings have found ways of retaining their sense of 
autonomy in both their ways of knowing and more so, those of being. 
III. ART’S TRUTH
We broadly agree that our diverse encounters with the arts happen by dint 
of values that bridge practice with affectation, use with need.21 However, 
externalizing these values from both art’s immanence and the existential 
actuality of arts practice, invariably results in a complete failure to secure any 
working consensus around the meaning of art.22 Though this comes with the 
territory of aesthetic understanding and dialogue—which as Huntoon suggests, 
is a “comfort zone” for those who make and partake in art qua art—it is not 
always the case when another approach to the arts requires that an external 
sphere comes into play.23 The “comfort zone” becomes unsatisfactory, if not 
insufficient, to those legitimating mechanisms and institutional narratives that 
express the need to categorize the arts by neatly locating them within a 
taxonomy that ranges from aesthetic affect to institutional use, thus spanning 
between inherent-immanent and extrinsic-instrumental sets of criteria.24
Let us begin with the relationship between truth and legitimation. Reading 
the question of arts’ legitimacy from the context within which Jürgen Habermas 
positions values and norms within an accordance sought from specific 
19. Id.
20. See, for example, his discussion of reason and subjectivity in MAX HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE
OF REASON 7–11 (1974). 
21. See ERNST FISCHER, THE NECESSITY OF ART 23–38 (2010). 
22. See BENEDETTO CROCE, GUIDE TO AESTHETICS, at xxxi (1995). 
23. Huntoon, supra note 11. 
24. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRIES, supra note 8. 
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formations of motives that imply an “immanent relation with truth,”25 one 
would need to clarify the relationship that the arts play with the formation of 
motives, the nature of their immanence, and what we mean by truth. Borrowing 
from Piaget’s developmental approach, Habermas attributes motives to norm 
systems and behavioral controls, which is something that developmental 
psychologists interested in the arts have often referred to and elaborated in their 
theories of knowledge26 and learning.27
Given that Habermas’s concern is not art, but political systems and their 
legitimacy, he relates this to an ordering where the major players include moral 
and linguistic systems of rationality and legitimation.28 Here we are directed  
to a systematic aspect of how a moral and empirical ordering relates and 
competes in the structuring of a motivational formation; which is why 
Habermas seeks to focus on a context where “only this systematic aspect of the 
truth relation of factually valid norms and values is of interest,”29 and after 
which he goes on to discuss Max Weber’s concept of legitimate authority.30
While this seems to confirm a gulf between Habermas’s context and that of 
the arts, I would argue that taking the formation of motives from the immanence 
of art’s truth would reveal an interesting parallelism, especially when later he 
dwells on the “relation of legitimation to truth,”31 going on to state (again, with 
reference to socio-economic systems) the following: 
This relation to truth must be presumed to exist if one regards as 
possible a motivation crisis, resulting from a systematic scarcity of the 
resource of “meaning.” Non-contingent grounds for a disappearance 
of legitimacy can, that is, be derived only from an “independent”—
that is, truth-dependent— evolution of interpretive systems that 
systematically restricts the adaptive capacity of society.32
It is broadly agreed that unlike those competing approaches by which one 
attempts to legitimize equally complex fields such as health or education,33 in
the arts we find a very different scenario. In fact, any attempt to categorize the 
25. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 95. 
26. See generally JEROME BRUNER, ON KNOWING: ESSAYS FOR THE LEFT HAND (1979).
27. See generally VIKTOR LOWENFELD, CREATIVE AND MENTAL GROWTH (1957). See also 
HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 95. 
28. See HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 95. 
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 97. 
32. Id.
33. See IVAN ILLICH, DISABLING PROFESSIONS 15–18 (2000); IVAN ILLICH, LIMITS TO 
MEDICINE: MEDICAL NEMESIS, THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH 40–44 (2000). 
40672-m
qi_22-1 Sheet No. 57 Side A      05/20/2019   14:43:36
40672-mqi_22-1 Sheet No. 57 Side A      05/20/2019   14:43:36
C M
Y K
8. BALDACCINO.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2018 12:06 PM 
2018] RIGHT TO CREATIVE ILLEGITIMACY 109
arts in forms of legitimation and use, has proven to be elusive.34 Neither an 
approach of developmental hierarchies as found in the pedagogy or sociology 
of art, nor a philosophical approach that positions the arts within a polity (even 
precariously), and less so a network of uncomfortable (yet assertive) forms of 
advocacy, have managed to comprehensively identify the motivational 
formation by which art’s immanence would legitimize art’s truth.35
It appears that there is no last word on how the arts are played in the 
complex ways of human living. This is not because there is some intent on 
disinterested arrogation from those who make the arts and who somehow 
exclude, on purpose, the claim to meaning. Far from it. Arts practitioners will 
be the first to seek modes of legitimation, particularly when they themselves 
need to claim the legitimacy of their own existence as artists, which appear 
external to them. The impossibility to which I am referring has more to do with 
art’s very own immanence, which can neither be reduced to a domain of 
philosophy,36 nor is it a question settled on a precariously cobbled up 
hermeneutic ground of relational mechanisms that refuse definition.37
IV. MAKERS, MAKING, AND THE MADE
I would argue that Habermas’s interest in how “the values and norms in 
accordance with which motives are formed have an immanent relation with 
truth”38 is central to any discussion over the legitimacy of art. If we are to speak 
of immanence, whether assumed in one instance or in art’s claim to a double 
iteration,39 we are not absolved from its definition, especially when the claim 
at stake is a legitimation that is posed on art’s truth. 
A number of questions cannot be avoided. What is art’s immanence? What 
does it portend when we speak of it? What are we exactly making reference to 
when we claim art’s immanence as that which relates to art’s truth? Does art’s 
truth only depend on art’s immanence? Could art’s truth be externally 
construed? Could it be attributed via non-art? 
These questions leave us perplexed. It seems that in trying to understand 
art’s immanence from how it relates to the truth—i.e., its own truth—there is 
34. See Baldacchino, Art’s Asymptotic Leadership, supra note 12, at 297. 
35. Id.
36. See ARTHUR DANTO, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF ART 5–9 (1986) 
(critiquing such attempts to do so).
37. See generally NICOLAS BOURRIAUD, RELATIONAL AESTHETICS (2002).
38. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 95. 
39. After Jacques Rancière’s Malaise dans l’esthétique (2004), I have discussed at length this 
suggestion of art’s two moments, or indeed forms of immanence in John Baldacchino, ART ± 
EDUCATION: The Paradox of the Ventriloquist’s Soliloquy, 3 SISYPHUS: J. OF EDUC. 55–71 (2015) 
and JOHN BALDACCHINO, ART’S WAY OUT 91–92 (2012). 
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nothing gained in sustaining a convincing way of evaluating the arts by their 
proprietary value. This is because if we are to speak of the truth of art, we must 
ascertain its “location,” though such an argument begins to confuse the role of 
art as a noun with art as a collective designation of an action: that of poetic 
making. This truth cannot simply equate with the proprietary value of art, even 
when often this claim would immediately flag up notions of an integrity gained 
from identifiable properties that could only belong to that which we call true. 
It is still problematic to claim that what legitimizes the integral properties 
of art is the same as its appropriation. Is the art that makes things the same as 
the things made by art? Is the making the same as the made? Do they belong, 
or indeed could they relate, to the truth of art? Are they the truth of art? 
To the first question of equivalence, one would be quick to answer in the 
negative: No, the act of making is not the same as the object that this action 
made. But then, when one comes to the interior properties that are immanent 
to the making and the made, could we do without their inherent relationship? 
Are not we speaking of two forms of immanence, or perhaps an immanence 
that has two or more facets?40
Art as an act of making appears as immanent; the work of art as that which 
is made appears as external, though the work of art is a manifestation of the art 
that made it. When we speak of art as an act of making that helps us feel better, 
or as a making that is a method which could be borrowed by a businessperson 
thinking of new strategies, are we still speaking of art? 
As in the approach to art’s truth, the work of art remains a relation to art 
itself. Art inheres in the objects that it makes. It is therefore this inherence that 
relates art’s immanence to its truth. The norm and value systems that we often 
impose on art are not exerted on the process of art-making, but on the product, 
the making, the work of art. Yet a counter-critique comes from what inheres in 
these works, which is the art that made them and therefore the person or the 
human drive that motivated the act of making a work of art in the first place. 
Forgetting this relational approach between maker, making, and the made 
will ultimately miss out, forgo, and undermine art’s truth. However, it seems 
that the agency that is expected to characterize art’s truth in the integrity by 
which we claim it cannot escape the reflexive and tautological cycle by which 
art’s own agency and the agency by which art is approached become one and 
the same thing, or perhaps ultimately have to belong to the same cycle.
It is important to clarify how integrity is iterated at least twice: (i) by means 
of the integrity of the action of legitimation and (ii) through the integrity of art 
in terms of its truth. This is to say that to approach art through its own 
40. Baldacchino, ART ±EDUCATION, supra note 39; BALDACCHINO, ARTS WAY OUT, supra
note 39. 
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proprietary integrity also means that such attributes are reflexive of art’s 
integrity. Put simply, the approach itself must have integrity as it needs to tally 
with art’s truth. This gets close to the tautology that asserts art’s truth-value. 
V. TO EXCUSE, TO JUSTIFY, TOELEVATE.
The claim to integrity warrants some elaboration on the proprietary and 
appropriative characters of art, as they are articulated by the tautological cycle 
that gives art its truth-value.41 Resorting to the French word le propre (and the 
Italian il proprio) we will find some valuable distinctions, or at the very least 
we could illustrate how the proprietary implies: 
(a) that which is proper to, in the sense of how the attributes or truth-values 
that we assume of art, in this case, belong to art as art and not as something 
else—whether this something else appears to be a form of aesthetical-affective, 
social-moral, and formative-cultural legitimation;42 but also, 
(b) that which asserts the action of art as an event that signals an entelecheic 
lineage from maker, to making and the made. Here the implication of external 
sources by which art’s truth is partaken and returned to art, is also partaking 
(and appropriating) that remains, (in the remits of legitimacy and truth) within 
the sphere of action that comes from art by dint of those diverse properties that 
we attribute to it. We must bear in mind that in this grid of truth values, we 
find that these diverse properties are the same as art itself; which is different to 
say that these properties are equivalent to those non-artistic forms of external 
legitimation, including aesthetical-affective, social-moral and formative-
cultural forms of legitimation.43
This distinction needs to be had if we want to elucidate, and even locate,
where art’s immanence in its relation to its truth is found. This also clarifies 
what we mean by the proprietary aspects that need to be shifted away from 
identifiable attempts by which art’s proprietary legitimation remains external 
to art itself. To better clarify this, I identify three scenarios where legitimation 
is confused with an excuse, justification, and elevation of the arts by aesthetical- 
affective, social-moral and formative-cultural forms of legitimation: 
(i) The first is a renewed form of art for art’s sake (art pour l’art), which is 
to say that the arts are not autonomous but where some would simply refuse to 
assume anything but a limited pseudo-aesthetic excuse to explain art as a matter 
that cannot go beyond personal taste.44
(ii) Then there is the equally problematic, yet more widely used, attempt to 
41. See Baldacchino, ART ± EDUCATION, supra note 39. 
42. See BALDACCHINO, ART’S WAY OUT, supra note 39. 
43. Id.
44. See EMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 43–45 (Hackett Publishing, 1987). 
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justify those socio-political claims by which some would insist that the arts are 
integral to the functions of the city-state.45 We know that the banishing of the 
arts from the city-state was originally prompted by Plato’s philosophical 
assumption that the arts must serve a purpose at the lower end of the hierarchy 
of truth and its ensuing political taxonomy.46 This was a precursor to the 
assumptions of need, which we still nurture in those educational and 
socioeconomic hierarchies whose taxonomies are no less indifferent to the arts, 
and to which we seem to want to hold when we seek to justify the arts against 
their structural ordering.47
(iii) The last in this troika is found at the other end of the spectrum, where 
some insist on elevating the arts on the presumed levels of those high moral- 
pedagogical formations which, in their contemporary reformulation they are 
found short of a failed re-enactment of Hegel’s cultural formative notion of 
Bildung, by which art somehow flanks other forms of freedom like religion and 
philosophy.48 Apart from distorting, if not precluding, any possibility for art’s 
immanence to relate to its own truth, this attempt leaves matters in the worst 
possible scenario, especially when the intention is premised on the denial of the 
contingencies by which, as I will explain below, the arts have successfully 
resisted all those efforts to stultify their autonomy.49
VI. “DOING AN ACT” AND “DOING SOMETHING.”
In the attempts to excuse, justify and elevate the arts, a fundamental 
distinction remains missing. Here I refer to the second epigraph that opens this 
essay, which I cite from John Langshaw Austin’s essay A Plea for Excuses.50
Insofar as he wants to make a case for the excuse as a philosophical point of 
worth, Austin reminds us that ‘“truth” is not a name for a characteristic of 
assertions” just as “freedom” neither is a name nor does it name or characterize 
a set of actions.51 Rather, Austin explains, freedom is a “name of a dimension 
in which actions are assessed.”52
Austin’s remarks could very well help us understand the meaning of action 
45. Here I do not mean the state as a sealed political system, but the assemblage of vested
interests that are established across social, corporate and political hegemonies. 
46. For example, see the discussion of mimesis and truth in Plato, The Republic, in THE
COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO INCLUDING THE LETTERS, Book X 603b–604, at 828–29 (Edith 
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1989). 
47. See John Baldacchino, Art’s Gaming Lost: Within the Make-Belief of Curricular Certainty,
2 CURRICULUM STUDIES 333–35 (1994). 
48. See generally GEORGE W. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (1977).
49. See infra Section VII.
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itself, though here I am not claiming to be addressing or indeed travelling with 
Austin’s own theory of action as prominently elaborated in his philosophy.53
What interests me is the distinction that Austin makes by which he seeks the 
dimension of action—in his case that of the excuse—to position an assertion 
that would, in my case, help me understand or at the very least approximate, 
my claim to art’s right to creative illegitimacy.54
Below I will cite instances where, early in his essay, Austin alerts and warns 
his readers about a number of common misconceptions by which actions are 
misplaced with the result that the arguments made could well become 
nonsensical.55 In the discussion of art’s truth this danger is commonplace. 
Most of the confusion is found in the way by which those who write about art, 
tend to forgo, ignore or misunderstand the reality that art-making—perhaps 
unlike works of art—often confirms the insufficiency of language. 
This insufficiency is best exemplified in how art’s legitimation is often 
expressed through the borrowed speech of the philosopher, psychologist, 
educationalist, or social theorist.56 Yet, while such forms of description and 
argument might have managed to get close to what could be seen as an external 
approach to art’s truth, art’s immanence can only be comprehensively 
understood from the actions by which art inheres in the objects that it makes— 
what the neo-Scholastic philosopher Etienne Gilson refers to as art’s 
positioning within the “order of factivity”.57
Yet to say that immanence can only be understood through the action of 
art-making presents another set of pitfalls. This is especially the case when 
artists who see themselves as the makers, simply refuse to engage with those 
who behold the objects that are made. This is often expressed as a realm where 
only specialists and connoisseurs are allowed to say or know what is “in” the 
work of art, with the result that knowledge is distorted into a realm of expertise. 
In such a rarified location, art’s legitimation simply alienates the artist from her 
art, as well as the audience from the artist, and the work of art from both the 
artist and the audience. In the realm of expertise, there is only one form of 
legitimacy, and it emerges as a legislative terrain that has nothing to do with 
art, let alone its truth-value.58
One can see how at the ends of this multidirectional stretch, there emerges 
a fundamental flaw in how art as action is simply avoided, perhaps in the same 
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 4. 
56. See DANTO, supra note 36. 
57. See ETIENNE GILSON, THE ARTS OF THE BEAUTIFUL 18–20 (2000). 
58. See, for example, Hauser’s sociological discussion of mediation and alienation vis-à-vis 
the art trade in ARNOLD HAUSER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF ART 506–17 (1982). 
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way that the excuse was simply dismissed as frivolous by philosophers and 
linguists alike until Austin drew everyone’s attention.59 To do so, Austin sets 
the scene for a plea of action by qualifying what we should avoid when talking 
about action;60 which would not be that far from saying that as we speak of art, 
we need to at least qualify what we mean, if only to set a common ground for a 
possible conversation. 
As it is invariably common for any description of action to fall within an 
ethical sphere of discussion, Austin remarks that “before we consider what 
actions are good or bad, right or wrong, it is proper to consider first what is 
meant by, and what not, and what is included under, and what not, the 
expression ‘doing an action’ or ‘doing something.’”61
As we have seen in the distinctions between art-making as an action and 
the work of art as an object, one begins to understand how art as an action 
requires a constant examination of what it denotes, especially when the task is 
to find a reason and meaning for art as a motive by which its immanence is 
related to its truth. The truth of “an action” is different from the truth of 
“something.” We often use the word “art” to mean the same as an “action” and 
a “something.”62 The distinction may not be problematic in certain contexts, 
especially when we speak of art as that which brings together art’s action as 
inherent in the something that someone makes for someone else. However, 
when we question “What is the value of this action?”, as we have seen already, 
distinctions need to be had. 
In this respect, Austin’s warnings have a lot of relevance to how we 
understand legitimation and where we can locate it.63 However, as we have 
seen in the pitfalls of the maker insisting on the expertise of his actions, the 
action itself cannot be assumed as a comforting zone, because this could be 
reduced to a reification of the act of making itself—as we often find in the futile 
debates over process and product. Again, the claim of the maker is that this is 
simply implied, and that an explanation of making would in effect reduce 
everything to a procedure. While this is extremely valid, it does not mean that 
the question of immanence is satisfied by the designation of complex processes. 
There is indeed a vague and comforting idea in the background that, after 
all, in the last analysis, doing an action must come down to the making of 
physical movements with parts of the body; but this is about as true as that 
saying something must, in the last analysis, come down to making movements 
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of the tongue.64
The way Austin puts it appears comical, if not absurd, though ultimately to 
justify or indeed guarantee the relation between an act and its immanence (by 
its assumed relation to its truth), cannot be satisfied by stating that art-making 
holds the secret and somehow this is justified by the fact that it happens. Just 
as one cannot simply explain particular actions (like riding a bike, or 
swimming) by going through a carefully described procedure, in the complex 
nature of art’s praxis, action and practice require one to be engaged with over 
a number of mediational and experiential terrains, using a number of elements 
which directly contribute to how, in this case, legitimation could help us make 
sense of the intentionality by which art is directed towards the world. 
Austin takes this from a two-fold approach. The first is to “ask how we 
decide what is the correct name for ‘the’ action that somebody did—and what, 
indeed, are the rules for the use of ‘the’ action, ‘an’ action, ‘one’ action, a ‘part’ 
or ‘phase’ of an action and the like.”65
This takes us to how “we need to realize that even the ‘simplest’ named 
actions are not so simple.”66 Austin urges his readers to “ask what more, then, 
comes in (intentions? conventions?) and what does not (motives?), and what is 
the detail of the complicated internal machinery we use in ‘acting’—the receipt 
of intelligence, the appreciation of the situation, the invocation of principles, 
the planning, the control of execution and the rest.”67
Limited space does not permit a detailed treatment of what Austin means 
by the “machinery of action.”68 This would warrant a whole separate paper if 
one were to attempt to explore its possible relevance to the implications of art 
as an action and of how the distinctions that this machinery clarifies would help 
us write and speak much more clearly about art’s truth value. 
VII. CREATIVE ILLEGITIMACY
As actions are increasingly assessed, the claim for a legitimacy that finds 
an intersection between meaning and intention becomes a concern. While 
identifiable parameters by which one understands action in art are necessary for 
a clearer discourse by which the complexity of this sphere is approached, on 
the other hand the question of legitimacy remains problematic the closer one 
gets to such a complex state of affairs. This is especially the case when art 
continuously brings up the issue of autonomy in both its claim for action—that 
64. Id.
65. Id. at 5. 
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 19–20. 
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of making.69 More so we need to better understand how the work of art is never 
beholden to one original intention, the main reason being that the intentions that 
art’s audience brings to the work knows neither end nor finitude. 
As one revisits the machinery of action, whose intentions, conventions and 
motives run its various operations on several levels, any legitimizing procedure 
that seeks to understand and capture art’s immanence in relation to its truth 
cannot be captured in complete form.70 It would mean that one has to bring 
together the infinite intentions which converge upon the exchange between the 
infinite intentions that are brought to bear in the art event, whose actors include 
artists, art-making, works of art, and an audience, which in turn gives rise to 
further events again, and again, and again . . . ad infinitum. 
Whatever an art event may be—a painting, installation, play, novel, musical 
work, video, a choreography, et cetera—the process of action that takes place 
is mostly characterized by a cycle that moves from contingency to autonomy, 
heteronomy, and back.71 Here I am capturing this cycle in three diagrams that 
offer a very open-ended model of what a snapshot of these forms of action could 
conceptually look like.72
69. See generally Baldacchino, Art’s Asymptotic Leadership, supra note 12. 
70. See AUSTIN, supra note 2, at 19. 
71. See JOHN BALDACCHINO, INTRODUCTION. HISTORIES AND PHILOSOPHIES. THE WILEY
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ART AND DESIGN EDUCATION (forthcoming 2018). 
72. Here I propose to elaborate a similar cycle of actions, which I have discussed in my 
Introduction at Baldacchino, Introduction. Id.
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Figure 1. Contingent actions; Figure 2. Autonomous actions; Figure 3. 
Heteronomous actions
In capturing the flow of this constellation of art events, one begins with 
contingent action (Fig. 1), where random art events appear to take all possible 
directions, as they appear to each other in simultaneous though random 
exchange. This characterizes the contingent moments of “doing as an act,” 
characterized as a highly mutable and inconsistent state of affairs.73
It may or may not be the case that these actions share a common space 
designated to accommodate art events. Random art events, in their 
simultaneity, immediately confirm their disposition of “doing something.”74
This action is crudely assumed as that moment where art articulates its need to 
do something as art-making, and where the work of art begins to formulate 
itself.75
One could argue that there is a phenomenological predisposition to the fact 
that these actions are also placed. In this respect when they appear to be with 
others by the accident of being there, those who are engaged in the art event 
tend to look sideways and move on with the distinct awareness that they are not 
isolated figures, as so often the romantic assumption of the lone artist goes. 
Yet as one begins to understand this state of affairs inter-subjectively, it 
simply means that there are other subjects engaged in an equally contingent 
manner. They demonstrate no specific need to socialize on a universal horizon. 
This is thereby sustained as a horizon of particularities, where each and every 
art event assumes its own universality by dint of its singularity, thus inhabiting 
a universe of singularities. It is no less paradoxical to add that in the inter- 
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their claim for autonomy. This autonomy is symptomatic of art’s inability to 
sustain its contingent “origin,” simply because art is never tied to any singular 
intention. The sheer reality of others, and the assertion of art’s events and being 
others-amongst-each-other warrants autonomous action. (Fig. 2).
The art event asserts its autonomous character by dint of the fact that “doing 
as action” must inhere in the “something” that the action makes.76 As we have 
already argued, art’s action inheres in what it makes as its immanence is 
asserted iteratively in multiple ways.77 This pushes back those legitimizing 
expectations that externalize art’s action into an enabler of other actions.78
Art’s inherence in “the object that it makes” allows us to speak of the 
immanence art asserts at least twice: (a) as that which is inherent to the making, 
and (b) as that by which works of art continue to inhere in their open-ended and 
plural longevity.79 But as contingency is asserted by the autonomy of art’s 
action qua a universe of singularities, the dispositions that emerge from (b) 
acquire a plasticity by which those who experience art also partake of art’s 
action together.80
Here, art moves into a heteronomous phase of action (Fig. 3) where far from 
being prompted by the need to legitimize its existence, the event of art asserts 
its heteronomous truth by which it delegitimized the expectancies of 
heteronomy itself.81 The paradox that originally moved art from its contingent 
arrangement of actions to the sphere of autonomous action as a form of 
heteronomous action, now breaks into the cycle of legitimation by manifesting 
a new phase of its dialectic: that of rightful illegitimacy.82
In asserting its heteronomy, art lays claim on its right to illegitimacy by 
which it moves out of the expectations of legitimation to assert its plasticity.83
More importantly, what appears to be an involution where action collapses onto 
itself.84 This collapse empowers art to reject and render irrelevant any 
instrumentalist imposition on its presumed legitimacy.85
If we do not understand how art inheres, and how its immanence relates to 
its truth by dint of this constant movement of collapse into itself, we will fail to 
understand how art is that human disposition toward a full understanding of the 
76. Id.
77. See supra Section III. 
78. Id.
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contingent origins of its autonomous nature. The affordance of this paradox 
becomes possible at the moment of heteronomy, which is also the moment 
when art’s action enters into its own negation and collapses back to its 
contingent nature. 
VIII. MAKER SPACES
While this appears to be idealistic in tenor, readers will recall that this 
model is not new to both science and philosophy. Starting with the dialectic 
that Hegel adopts in his Aesthetics where he discusses what he identifies as 
Symbolic, Classical and Romantic forms of art,86 this gains pragmatic 
tangibility in Dewey’s philosophy of growth.87 The origins of Dewey’s 
approach is Hegelian inasmuch as Dewey’s work also became profoundly 
influenced by scientific inquiry, especially Darwin’s,88 and more so by Charles 
Sanders Peirce’s semiotics,89 and William James’s psychology90—not to 
mention European philosophers, such as Dewey’s contemporary, Henri 
Bergson,91 whose theories of simultaneity, memorial time, and new approaches 
to creative evolutionary processes ran in parallel with Einstein’s revolution in 
scientific thinking.92
Dewey’s philosophy of experimentation, plasticity and growth, continues 
to remind us of the claim he makes in Democracy and Education, where the 
condition for growth remains persistently predicated on the need of a state of 
immaturity.93
By way of contextualizing the thinking behind what I have am proposing 
in this essay, I would cite from what I consider to be one of Dewey’s most 
exciting, if not heretical, essays that he wrote in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, The Superstition of Necessity.94 There, Dewey states 
clearly and 
86. See GEORGE W. HEGEL, AESTHETICS: LECTURES ON FINE ART, intro, 75–82, 299–602 
(1975).
87. See generally JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (1922).
88. See generally JOHN DEWEY, THE INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER
ESSAYS (1910).
89. See generally Charles Sanders Peirce, What is a Sign?, in THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE:
SELECTED WRITINGS, VOL 2, 4–10 ( Nathan Houser et. al eds., 1992). 
90. See generally William James, Pragmatism, in WRITINGS 1902-1910 (Bruce Kuklick ed., 
1988); WILLIAM JAMES, Psychology: Briefer Course in WRITINGS 1878-1899 (Gerald Myers ed., 
1992).
91. See generally HENRI BERGSON, CREATIVE EVOLUTION (1983).
92. Id. at 59–86, 272–97. 
93. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF EDUCATION 41 (1922). 
94. John Dewey, The Superstition of Necessity, 3 THE MONIST 362, 362 (1983). 
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without flinching or raising a shred of doubt, that “contingent and necessary 
are . . . the correlative aspects of one and the same fact.”95 Even after so many 
years, this still comes across as an explosive claim, as it means that any 
assumption that privileges necessity over contingency for the sake of some 
bigger whole is to be defied. In terms of what we are discussing in this essay, 
the implication of Dewey’s claim is that any structure of legitimacy that 
normally hinges on a necessary whole is rendered irrelevant.96 There, Dewey 
is both adamant and clear.97
Here we have our choice: we may deny the existence of any organicwhole 
in life and keep chasing in a never-ending series, the progressus ad infinitum,
after an end valid in itself. In this case we never get beyond a hypothetical 
necessity—something is necessary if we are to have something else, the 
necessity being relative to the implied doubt. Or, being convinced that life is a 
whole and not a series merely, we may say there is one comprehensive end wh 
gives its own validity to the lesser ends in so far as they constitute it. While, 
on the other alternative, we reach only a hypothetical necessity, on this we 
reach none at all.98
What are the bearings of legitimacy when the contingent and necessary are 
seen as correlating to the same fact? As I am here suggesting that art’s action 
follows a cycle that moves from contingency to heteronomy, only to collapse 
under the weight of the autonomy that bridges them, are we settling for a 
progressus ad infinitum? Is this simply better than none at all? 
I want to conclude this paper, by citing an example drawn from a 
pedagogical model adopted in the University of Wisconsin–Madison, and 
which I am pretty sure has parallels in similar setups elsewhere. This Creative 
Arts Community is named, rather unpretentiously, The Studio, and there is a 
simple reason for it. The Studio is a pedagogical model that entirely emerges 
from the notion of a studio space—what is sometimes called a maker space— 
which in and of itself allows, rather than determines, the opportunity for a 
number of freshmen to come together, in a pretty random self-elective way, and 
engage in arts events of their own creation.
So far this seems like a normal studio in an art school. However, what is 
different is that here not only these students are not, in the main, arts specialists, 
but where what brings them together is diversity—understood not only in the 
legalistic way of minority groups but in the self-election of one’s own 
existential and in this case artistic identity by which these students opt to find 
95. Id. at 372. 
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themselves placed, rather contingently, within these maker spaces. 
The goals set for this program are quite unassuming. Here I cite verbatim,
from The Studio’s website: 
• Create an arts and design-centered living-learning experience that 
encourages interdisciplinary exploration
• Connect with a roster of talented artists and designers, including 
UW-–Madison faculty in a variety of arts departments 
• Have access to onsite rehearsal, study, drafting and performance 
spaces
• Participate in programming that caters to your specific interest.
99
While one could attempt to process these objectives as legitimizing values 
whereby the inherence of their categorical assumptions is easily transferred to 
a truth-value that would in turn justify such a program, this cannot be further 
from what actually happens. 
The Studio’s curriculum adopts a structure that is invested in the 
illegitimacy of art events.100 Students normally volunteer themselves to 
articulate what they see as their way to rebut the pressures and expectations by 
which the normal state of affairs in their studies out there would somehow limit, 
if not totally frustrate their creative ambitions. 
Far from students coming together to do what comes to their mind, the 
pedagogical structures that emerge in this program are mostly taking an 
opposite direction. In their various artistic creations, these students assert their 
autonomy by mostly showing strong signs of unlearning.101 Typical of any 
studio pedagogy, unlearning is a mainstay of art’s illegitimate directions of 
teaching.102 However, in The Studio, the unlearning that takes place goes even 
against what is expected in the normal studio in an art, drama, dance or music 
school.103 The type of unlearning here is active. It is sought by the student 
intent on repositioning her life on a trajectory by which she would be able to 
handle. 
The exemplars that one finds in the various archives of The Studio104 show




102. See Baldacchino, ART ± EDUCATION, supra note 41; JOHN BALDACCHINO & GERT
BIESTA, Weak subjects: On Art’s Art of Forgetting. An Interview with John Baldacchino, Interviewed 
by Gert Biesta, ARTS, ARTISTS AND PEDAGOGY (Chris Naughton et al. (eds.), London Routledge, 
2017).
103. University Housing, supra note 99. 
104. University of Wisconsin-Madison, The Studio (April 29, 2018, 12:35 PM), 
https://thestudiouw.arts.wisc.edu [https://perma.cc/9RTC-HE79]. There are multiple exemplars and 
videos in The Studio 2017a.
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a high degree of success, if one measures success by how these students do not 
just seek or measure success by the conventions given to them, but in their 
comprehensive understanding of forms of knowing that would also appreciate 
the role of what others may well deem to be an “error” or “failure.” In some 
cases, these are not simply events that happen in the safe space of the studio, 
but also events that spill out into the very existential forms of coping with a 
world which most of these students have found to be, if not entirely hostile, 
quite unfamiliar and foreign—especially in those cases where one is born 
foreign into one’s own environs for reasons of class, race, ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality, faith or any other form of human existence.105
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
By way of concluding this essay, I would invite readers to briefly reflect on 
The Studio’s example against the scenario that this paper proposes to set, where 
art duly claims its right to illegitimacy. 
In setups like The Studio one must understand that there are two agencies 
in play. The first has to do with the student’s personal and existential 
legitimacy, as an explanation to one’s self as to why one needs to attend or 
indeed join institutions such as a university. This presents fundamental 
challenges to one’s own experience. This is particularly the case in those 
populations which universities—rightfully or wrongfully—identify as 
underrepresented groups, and by which the student is self-identifying her own 
positioning within institutions that have particular histories and which form part 
of traditions which, even when it comes to the arts, have not always been 
welcome. In the second instance, we have the context of art itself, which not 
unlike the “underrepresented” student is a constellation of disciplines that over 
many centuries, but more so since the arts entered the legislative spheres of 
academia, have had their fair share of ambiguity. To date, the arts are still 
expected to fit in a whole hierarchy of norms and expectations that consistently 
remind artists that the onus is on them to adapt.106
105. Id.
106. A good example is how the very notion of “arts research” now plays a role in universities, 
only to be precariously ensconced in contexts that either instrumentalized the arts as those abilities 
which would attract funding if they are merged with the sciences (the forced evolution from STEM to 
STEAM being a good example; not to mention the whole myth around the fallacy or the “Right 
Brain/Left Brain” industry, which is nothing but a folklore that has created a whole cottage industry of 
legitimacy by itself), but also where when the arts are asserted in their own integrity, this falls into a 
trap that would either weaken the position of the arts in academia, or at the very bests eroticises the 
arts into a rarefied luxury, which academia wears as a badge of honour. For more information, see 
John Baldacchino, Educing Art’s Indescribable Practice: Four theses on the impossibility of art’s 
research, 2 DERIVAS: INVESTIGAÇÃO EM EDUCAÇÃO ARTÍSTICA 97–105 (2015); John Baldacchino, 
Opening the picture: On the political responsibility of arts-based research, 10 INT’L J. FOR EDUC.&  
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Art’s right to illegitimacy is far from being a metaphor for dissent. Beyond 
a simple reaction against the “system,” the arts are the result of the ability of 
human beings to recognize and operate within what Derrida,107 after Plato,108
calls the illegitimate, bastard space, of the khôra which in the Timaeus, Socrates
identifies as a third genre by which human beings have survived between two 
orders: the legalistic realms of the logos, and the representational symbolic 
structures of mythos.109
As the khôra refuses to be defined by either the legalese of logos or the 
semiosis of mythos110—where mistakenly many would put the arts alongside 
other forms of human representation—the right to illegitimacy reclaims its 
rightful place in the khôra. By dint of the khôra, humans lay claim and assert 
a third dimension for their free intelligence.111 This is a genre that either goes 
unrecognized—partly due to our tendency to work and think in dualist 
assumptions—or is rejected as an illegitimate state of affairs.112 Yet in their 
wisdom, the ancients recognized the need for such a third genre.113 Socrates
walks his students on this illegitimate ground.114
It is not the semiosis of the mythos, but the illegality of the khôra that has 
always confirmed what art stands for. Ever since the first known marks were 
left in caves in Blombos, Altamira and Lascaux, we know that humans have 
insisted on inhabiting a third genre that rejected the dualisms by which, over 
history, the hegemony of word and representation has oppressed the many.115
The marks of the khôra confirm that in their aesthetic anticipation of events, 
women and men never stopped expressing a concrete and pragmatic awareness 
that the contingent and the necessary belong to the same facts of daily living.116
Art anticipates and confirms Dewey’s mistrust of the superstition of 
necessity.117 Consistently, art has shown that humanity needs to grasp 
uncertainty as its source of freedom. More so, in its simultaneous events, art’s 
action stands as a reminder that the certainties by which humanity has been 
THE ARTS 1 (2009).
107. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA DERRIDA, KHÔRA (1993).
108. See generally Plato, Timaeus, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO INCLUDING THE 
LETTERS (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1989). 
109. See id. at 48e–49b, 1176. 





115. See BALDACCHINO, ART’S WAY OUT, supra note 39, at 112. 
116. See id.
117. See Dewey, supra note 94. I would argue that it was Dewey’s deep engagement with art 
that pushed him in the philosophical directions that he took. 
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superstitiously been trapped must make way for the realization that paradox is 
the hallmark of our claim to freedom and intelligence. 
Does this claim to illegitimacy give way to irrationality and chaos? 
Certainly not. However, what this opens, is a society that seeks to understand 
truth from the condition that it often dismisses as its shortcomings, which the 
arts have continuously enabled us to see, time and again, as the norm of our 
being in the world, and not the exception to avoid. 
